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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
that the township is voted dry relieves both parties of further liability.
The improbability of the parties foreseeing and expressly providing for
this contingency was the basis for granting the relief. The principles of
this case are in conformity with previous Ohio decisions.8
JOE H. MUNSTER, JR.
CORPORATIONS, PARTNERSHIPS, AND
ASSOCIATIONS
Service on partnerships and on corporations, suits against individual
members of associations, substantive questions of partnership contracts,
the ultra vires doctrine, and the authority of officers of closely-held corpo-
rations were subjects that were considered by the courts in Ohio during
1961.
It seems to this writer that these courts, like courts throughout the
country, have in these decisions continued the movement of the common
law away from formalism toward realism and determination of contro-
versies on their merits.
SERVICE OF PROCESS
In Modern Contract Furnishings, Incorporated v. Bishop Internation-
al Engineering Company' the court was concerned with the validity of a
summons which was left at the Cincinnati office of a San Francisco part-
nership. Since no partner was a resident of or found in Ohio, the service
could be good only if a copy of the summons was left at the partnership's
usual place of doing business.'
The three principle issues which might have been before the court
were (1) whether "at its usual place of doing business," required merely
an office, or some other requirement of "doing business," (2) whether
1. 172 Ohio St. 200, 174 N.E.2d 615 (1961).
2. Id. at 212, 174 N.E.2d at 623.
3. Robert V. Clapp Co. v. Fox, 124 Ohio St. 331, 178 N.E. 586 (1931). See also 36
0. JuR. 2d Mechanic's Liens §§ 14, 68 (1959).
4. OHIO REV. CODE § 1311.14.
5. Gebhart v. United States, 172 Ohio St. 200, 215, 174 N.E.2d 615, 625 (1961). See
Bown & Sons v. Honabarger, 171 Ohio St. 247, 168 N.E.2d 880 (1960); Howk v. Krotzer,
140 Ohio St. 100, 42 N.E.2d 640 (1942); Bullock v. Horn, 44 Ohio St. 420, 7 N.E. 737
(1886). See also OHIO REV. CODE § 1311.24.
6. 174 N.E.2d 558 (Ohio C.P. 1960).
7. Ibid.
8. See, e.g., Goodman v. Sullivan, 94 Ohio App. 390, 114 N.E. 2d 856 (1952).
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the statute applied to non-resident partnerships doing business in Ohio,
and (3) what constitutes doing business for this purpose by a partnership.
Because the parties apparently agreed that the partnership was not doing
business in Ohio, the court had simply to say that since the partnership
was not "at law" doing business in Ohio, it could not have a "usual place
of doing business" and the service was not valid.
Due to this agreement by the parties upon which the court based its
decision, the most interesting problems raised by this case became moot.
In a 1924 appellate decision in Hamilton County,4 a court on a similar
factual situation had held that service on a partnership at its usual
place of business under the statute applied only to resident partnerships,
and that its application to non-residents would be repugnant to the four-
teenth amendment of the United States Constitution. The court in the
Modern Contract Furnishings case very properly questioned that decision,
recognizing that such an interpretation would render immune from ser-
vice in Ohio the growing number of large national partnerships.5 By
this obiter dictum, which favored service on a non-resident partnership,
the validity for service purposes of the orthodox concept that a partner-
ship is not a legal entity, separate from the individual partners, was in
effect doubted by this court.
In Moriarty v. Westgate Center, Incorporated6 another service of
summons problem required the Ohio Supreme Court to construe section
2703.10 of the Ohio Revised Code, which permits service upon the per-
son "having charge" of "the office or usual place of business" of a corpo-
ration when the principal officers who are specifically listed in the statute
are not presen 7
1. 14 Ohio Op. 2d 350 (C.P. 1960).
2. See Ohio Revised Code section 2703.08, which provides: "Service shall be made at any
time before the return day, by delivering a copy of the summons with the endorsements
thereon, to the defendant personally, or by leaving a copy at his usual place of residence; or,
if the defendant is a partnership sued by its company name, by leaving a copy at its usual
place of doing business or with any member of such partnership. The return must be made
at the time mentioned in the writ, and the time and manner of service shall be stated by the
writ."
3. That the plaintiff agreed so readily to this fact seems strange in view of the fact that the
partnership had an office and employees in Cincinnati.
4. Smith v. Pinkerton, 2 Ohio L. Abs. 618 (Ct. App. 1924).
5. Even under the decision in Smith v. Pinkerton, 2 Ohio L Abs. 618 (Ct. App. 1924), if
one of the partners was a resident of Ohio, then service on that partner in Ohio would suffice
for service on the entire partnership.
6. 172 Ohio St. 402, 176 N.E.2d 410 (1961).
7. Ohio Revised Code section 2703.10 provides: "A summons against a corporation may
be served upon the president, mayor, chairman or president of the board of directors or
trustees, or other chief officer;, or if its chief officer is not found in the county, upon its
cashier, treasurer, secretary, clerk, or managing agent; or if none of such officers can be found,
by a copy left at the office or the usual place of business of the corporation with the person
having charge thereof .... "
It is interesting to note, since the Moriarty and Modern Contract Furnishings cases are
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The issue in the Moriarty case was whether the statute requires the
sheriff to attempt service upon the officers listed in the statute as a con-
dition precedent to service simply on the person in charge of the office.'
The supreme court took the liberal, non-formal view. It discussed the
reason for service, the rationale of service statutes, and concluded that the
successive alternative methods of service upon a corporation are not man-
datory successive conditions precedent but successively likely methods of
promptly bringing to the attention of the corporation the fact that pro-
ceedings have been commenced against it. Therefore the court found
that a motion to quash the summons should be overruled if it is admitted,
or if there can be no reasonable conclusion from the evidence but that
the person in charge of the office brought the summons promptly to the
attention of the chief officer of the corporation.
SUIT AGAINST UNINCORPORATED AsSOCIATIONS
In Lyons v. American Legion Post No. 650 Realty Company' Judge
Zimmerman seemed almost to be delivering a law school lecture in his
well-considered opinion on the liability of members of an unincorporated
association. Among the most important reasons for the invention of the
corporation, whether for profit or not, was to provide a device which would
limit the liability of individuals. Members of unincorporated associations
lack such protection, however, and have always been exposed to liability.
Furthermore suits in Ohio by or against the association itself in its own
name, were not even possible until the enactment of Ohio Revised Code
sections 1745.01 through 1745.04 in 1955.10
The plaintiff in the Lyons case chose to sue the individual members
of an unincorporated association alleging that they were all negligent.
Because in Ohio an unincorporated association may now be sued in its
own name," the defendants convinced a common pleas court and a court
of appeals that no cause of action at all exists against the individual
members.
here considered in juxtaposition, that the statute relative to partnerships, Ohio Revised Code
section 2703.08, uses the words "its usual place of doing business," and in the statute relative
to corporations the words "usual place of business" are used. Query: was a distinction in-
tended by that difference?
8. For a complete discussion of the issues of this case, see Recent Decision, p. 605 infra.
9. 172 Ohio St. 313, 175 N.E.2d 733 (1961). Note that, although the American Legion
Post No. 650 Realty Company was listed in the style of the case as the defendant, the case
actually concerned the individual members of American Legion Post No. 650, an unincorpor-
ated association, who were joined as party defendants.
10. Section 1745.01 provides that any unincorporated association may contract, sue, or be
sued in its commonly known name; section 1745.02 provides that all assets of an unincor-
porated association are subject to judgments, execution, and other process; section 1745.03
provides for service of summons on an unincorporated association; and section 1745.04 pro-
vides that a change in the officers of such an association shall not abate any cause of action
against it.
11. OHIO REV. CODE § 1745.01.
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The supreme court dearly pointed out that but for the 1955 statute,
a voluntary association having no legal existence could not even be sued
by its association name, and the persons composing it would have to be
joined individually. The court held without question that the new
statutes do not abrogate this right to sue the individual members if the
plaintiff chooses to proceed that way. 2 The court pointed out that on
the trial evidence would have to be produced linking the defendants as
active participants in the injury producing affair to establish individual
liability and furthermore that the defendants must either have known or
in the exercise of ordinary care should have known of the defective condi-
tion of the instrumentality claimed to have caused the injury to be liable
for it.
With those instructions, and the further admonition that the other
elements necessary to support recovery would also have to be proved, the
cause was remanded to the trial court.
PARTNERSHIP CROSS-INSURANCE AGREEMENTS
The Court of Appeals of Butler County, in Oglesby-Barnitz Bank and
Trust Company v. Clark,"3 was faced with a partnership problem which
depended upon the interpretation of contract terms in the partnership
agreement. In January, 1948, Clark and Helsel, certified public account-
ants, entered into the business of public accounting and executed a writ-
ten partnership agreement, Helsel holding a lesser interest than Clark.
The partnership continued until 1955 when Helsel died as the result of
an accident.
The controversial paragraph of the agreement was:
That the life of each party shall forthwith be separately insured in the
sum of Ten Thousand ($10,000) dollars, and the cost thereof, and all
premiums thereon, shall be charged as a part of the expense of the
partnership. Each party shall forthwith designate the other party as
beneficiary in said policy of insurance, and in event of death of either
party, the surviving party shall use the proceeds of said insurance to
purchase the deceased party's interest in the firm.
In June of 1948, the partners purchased $10,000 life insurance poli-
des on each of their lives, and at the same time purchased $10,000 acci-
dental death and dismemberment policies, the beneficiary in each ca e
being the "partner of the insured." In 1954 each of the policies was in-
creased to $20,000 by virtue of a change in the group contracts of the
12. The court explained that in an association for profit, partners are liable as partners,
while in a veteran's organization not for profit, members are liable only on a principal-agent
basis.
13. 112 Ohio App. 31, 175 N.E.2d 98 (1961).
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Prudential Insurance Company and the Trustees of the American Insti-
tute of Accountants.
At Helsel's death his interest in the partnership was determined to
be $2846. As Helsel's death was by accident, both the life insurance and
accidental death policies became due, and Clark, the surviving partner,
received $40,000 from the insurance company. Helsel's executor ten-
dered conveyance of its "right, title and interest in and to the assets, in-
cluding good will" of the partnership. However, the executor was only
willing to accept the $40,000 for Helsel's share, whereas Clark offered
$2846 for the full interest of Helsel in the partnership. The trial court
gave judgment to the plaintiff executor for $47,364.38 and costs, and
Clark appealed.
The court of appeals stated that its duty as judicial expositor was to
interpret the partnership contract by ascertaining the actual meaning of
the words, not what the partners meant to have said. 4 Using this
premise, the court considered first the difference between life insurance
and accidental death policies, and concluded that only the life insurance
and not accidental death and dismemberment insurance was meant in the
agreement by its reference to "the life.., shall ... be. . . insured." Next
the court determined that the words "shall use the proceeds of said insur-
ance" meant that all of the proceeds from a $10,000 life policy were to be
paid for the deceased partner's interest, and not merely so much of the
proceeds as was necessary to buy out the interest after an appraisal of its
value. That the $10,000 life policy was raised to $20,000 the court
found "to be of no controlling significance," and final judgment was ren-
dered as a matter of law for $10,000.
The court did not discuss the fact that the partnership agreement pro-
vided for the keeping of books and that upon termination of the partner-
ship the assets and liabilities were to be ascertained, the debts of the part-
nership were to be discharged, and the remaining assets were to be dis-
tributed in specie in proportion to the capital each partner had invested.
Nor did the court do more than comment on the fact that Helsel's share
was less than Clark's at the outset but subsequently became equal.
Since the court confined itself almost exclusively to the interpretation
of the meaning of the words of the insurance paragraph of the partner-
ship agreement taken alone, the decision must be viewed as an analysis of
a contract rather than a discussion of partnership law, although mutual
insurance clauses are extremely common in partnership agreements and
the valuation or buyout clauses are often the most difficult to draft and
to construe.
14. "What the writers meant to have said but did not is foreign to our inquiry." Id. at 38,
175 N.E.2d at 103.
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ULTRA VIREs ACTS
Certainly the most significant case in the corporation field in Ohio
during the year was that decided by the United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit - In the Matter of B-F Building Corporation.5
Baird-Foerst Corporation, of which Messrs. Baird and Foerst were the
president and vice president, directors, and principal shareholders, pur-
chased merchandise from the General Electric Company. The same gen-
tlemen also formed the B-F Building Corporation, a real estate company
which held tide to the land occupied by Baird-Foerst. The stock owner-
ship, officers, and directors in the real estate corporation were identical to
the operating corporation. Mr. Baird's wife was the third director of
both companies. General Electric required the written guaranty of the
real estate company to secure Baird-Foerst Corporation's indebtedness to
it, and Messrs. Baird and Foerst gave such written guaranty, inadvertently
executing it "Baird-Foerst Building Corporation, Inc. by W. J. Baird,
President, H. Foerst, Vice President," instead of "B-F Building Corpora-
tion," which was the correct name.
The trustee in bankruptcy of B-F Building Corporation objected to
the allowance of the General Electric claims based on the guaranty, and
the referee and district court sustained his objections. The circuit court
stated in its opinion that the reasons advanced by the referee and the dis-
trict judge' for disallowance were (1) that the contract was signed by a
nonexistent corporation, (2) that the officers of the bankrupt had no
authority to bind the corporation, and (3) that the contract of guaranty
was beyond the powers of the corporation and was ultra vires and void.
It then said that in its judgment all of these grounds were without sub-
stance.
In one paragraph the court of appeals concluded that the dear inten-
tion of the guaranty was to bind the bankrupt, that there was no claim
that Baird and Foerst were connected with any other building company,
and that this is therefore a dear case of misnomer. Actually the district
judge likewise had held that "... . the corporation is nevertheless bound
if it is obvious that the name was given in error and that the corporation
sought to be bound is the corporation intended in the guarantee." 7
As to the second reason advanced by the referee for disallowance of
the claims, the appellate court here again took what appears to be a most
realistic and non-formal view, reasoning that it can hardly be said that the
two owners of all of the stock of a corporation, in signing a contract as
executive officers, acted without authority. The court said further that
15. 284 F.2d 679 (6th Cir. 1960).
16. See 12 WEsT. RE S. L REv. 634 (1961) for a discussion of the district court case.
Note that the author of that article took issue with the trial court.
17. In re B-F Building Corp., 182 F. Supp. 602, 603 (N.D. Ohio 1960).
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officers and directors of a dosed corporation frequently act informally,
but nevertheless have authority to bind the corporation.
The third issue, whether or not the guaranty contract was ultra vires
and therefore void, was the basic one upon which the referee and the dis-
trict judge were actually reversed, and the holding of this court would
seem effectively to have rung the death knell for ultra vires as a defense
against third parties in Ohio. Despite the apparently unequivocal lan-
guage of the statute, 8 the referee had held that the trustee, standing in
the shoes of the bankrupt in such capacity, could "question the acts of
directors," and the district judge held that the trustee may raise the defense
of ultra vires in a bankruptcy proceeding as if it were an action against
directors under the statute. 9 Having so held, the district judge then
found the guaranty to be ultra vires on the ground that the authority for
a corporation to make such a contract must be stated in the articles, or
the guaranty must be of assistance in carrying out one of the corporate
purposes which is stated in the articles.
The higher court first indicated that in its opinion the corporation
actually did have the authority to give a contract of guaranty, again tak-
ing a liberal view under the Ohio statute in force at the time.2" The
court said that in executing the contract of guaranty, the building com-
pany was merely guaranteeing the indebtedness of its tenant which was
the operating company. Having so found, the court then quoted Ohio
Revised Code section 1701.13(H) and said very simply: "The present
case does not fall within any of the exceptions permitted by the statute.""
The resultant holding is now unquestionably that even a trustee clothed
with the powers given him by a bankruptcy court cannot avoid a corpo-
rate obligation by the defense of ultra vires.
PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS
No survey article directed primarily to Ohio lawyers can omit men,
tion of State ex rel. Green v. Brown,22 decided early in 1962. Briefly,
18. Ohio Revised Code section 1701.11 (D) provides: "No lack of, or limitation upon, the
authority of a corporation shall be asserted in any action except (1) by the state in an action
by it against the corporation, (2) by or on behalf of the corporation against a director, an
officer, or any shareholder as such, (3) by a shareholder as such or by or on behalf of the
holders of shares of any class against the corporation, a director, an officer or any shareholder
as such, or (4) in an action involving an alleged overissue of shares."
19. It appears to this writer that the true application of the trustee's position in the shoes of
the bankrupt would have been in an action by the trustee against Baird and Foerst as directors
for any loss due to an unauthorized act.
20. That statute was Ohio General Code section 8623-8, which gave every corporation the
authority "to acquire, hold, encumber, transfer, guarantee, and dispose of ... evidence of in-
debtedness . . .and contracts of other persons, associations and corporations ... [and] to do
all things permitted by this act and to exercise all powers incidental to the purposes stated in
its articles." The statute in its present form is Ohio Revised Code section 1701.13(F) (5).
21. See note 18 supra.
22. 173 Ohio St. 114, 180 N.E.2d 157 (1962). For a discussion of the professional associa,
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